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9.1  Introduction 
In this chapter we will estimate the effective marginal rate of taxation on 
capital income in Japan over the past twenty years. In a recent paper, Shoven 
and Tachibanaki (1988) calculated this tax rate for the year  1980 and com- 
pared their result for the Japanese case with that for several industrial nations. 
This chapter builds upon the findings in their paper. First, we pay particular 
attention to the effect of taxation over the past twenty years. Since the growth 
rate of the Japanese economy had been a kind of “miracle”, ascertaining the 
impact of the taxation of capital income in those years would aid in determin- 
ing whether tax policy was effectively used to promote a higher rate of invest- 
ment activity. We present actual results for the years 1961, 1970, and 1980.’ 
Second, Shoven and Tachibanaki neglected to consider several special char- 
acteristics of  Japanese tax law.  This oversight does not necessarily weaken 
their result for 1980 because several studies have concluded that the influence 
of  special measures, such as tax-free reserves and special depreciation, has 
been virtually negligible in recent years. However, these measures must be 
taken into account when performing investigations for the years  1970 and 
1961, during which the economy underwent rapid growth. As will be shown 
later, several studies suggest the importance of these special tax measures. We 
also intend to examine the quantitative effect of tax-free reserves and special 
depreciation, first on the tax burden on capital income and, second, on invest- 
ment. 
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Third, one of  the reasons for the low tax rate on income from capital in 
Japan is the low personal tax rate on savings, as shown by Shoven and Tachi- 
banaki. We  will inquire into what the impact of the personal sector has been 
on the effective tax rate and on capital formation, and how the impact may 
have changed over time. We  will also treat the banking sector in such a way 
that the actual behavior of banks is reflected. In our analysis the banking sec- 
tor is of  particular importance because the household sector in this study in- 
cludes banks. 
In section 9.2 we briefly explain the methodology used to estimate the ef- 
fective rates, and in section 9.3 discuss several institutional arrangements that 
impinge on the corporate and personal tax laws. Section 9.4 gives the effective 
tax rates in the personal and banking sectors. Estimates of the Japanese effec- 
tive marginal tax rates are presented in section 9.5 and then compared with 
the results for the United States. Section 9.6 gives simulation results of pro- 
posed tax reforms, given our findings regarding the effective rates, and section 
9.7 provides a brief recapitulation. 
9.2  Methodology for Estimating the Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
This section presents our procedure for estimating the effective marginal 
tax rates on capital income. The essential concept we use is the tax “wedge” 
between the rate of return on investment and the rate of return on saving for a 
series of hypothetical marginal projects. King and Fullerton (1984) have pre- 
sented a detailed analysis of this tax-wedge formulation, hence our discussion 
of the methodology is very brief. 
The effective tax rate, t, is estimated as 
where p  is the pretax real rate of  return on the investment project, net of de- 
preciation, and s is the post-tax real rate of return to the saver who supplied 
the finance for the investment. The post-tax real rate of  return to the saver is 
given by 
(2) 
where m is the marginal personal tax rate on interest income, I  is the real 
interest rate, IT  is the rate of inflation, and wP  is the marginal personal tax rate 
on wealth. Equation (2) reflects the fact that it is nominal, not real, income 
which is subject to personal taxation. 
The minimum pretax real rate of return which an investment must earn in 
order to give an investor a competitive or equilibrium post-tax return is termed 
“the cost of capital.” The relationship between the cost of capital and the in- 
terest rate may be represented as 
s = (1 -  m)(r + IT) -  IT  -  WP’ 
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The cost of  capital function, c(r),  depends on the specifics of  the tax code. 
For a general situation involving a corporate tax, investment credit, and  a 
wealth tax, the expression for the cost of capital is given by 
where T is the corporate tax rate; A is the present value of any grants, credits, 
or allowances; p is the nominal discount rate; 6 is the economic depreciation 
rate; d, is a dummy variable that equals unity if  corporate wealth taxes are 
deductible from the corporate income tax base and zero otherwise; w,  is the 
tax rate of corporate wealth; d2 is a dummy variable that is set equal to unity 
if  assets take the form of inventories and zero otherwise; v is the proportion 
of inventories taxed on a first-in-first-out (FIFO) basis. 
Equation (4) was obtained from equation (5), the rate of  return on an in- 
vestment net of depreciation, and equation (6),  the present value of profits: 
(5)  p  = MRR -  6, 
where MRR is the gross marginal rate of return for one unit of investment, and 
- [(  1 -  T)MRR -  (1 -  d,T)Wc -  d,TU?T]  - 
p+6-.rr  , 
where V is the present discounted value of profits from a project. To  obtain 
equation (4), we also made use of  the equality between V and C (the cost of 
the project, which is equal to [l -  A]). 
We must next consider  A, the present value of tax savings from depreciation 
allowances and other grants associated with one unit of investment. We  pre- 
sent the special features of  the Japanese tax system in detail in the next sec- 
tion.  The  formulation given  there  by  equation  (11)  and  the  subsequent 
formulations in this chapter differ from the original King and Fullerton for- 
mulation. 
The final step is to relate the firm's discount rate to the market interest rate, 
since with distortionary taxes the values are different. The difference depends 
on the source of  finance. For debt finance the relationship is simple, since 
nominal interest income is taxed and nominal interest payments are tax deduc- 
tible. For the other two sources of finance, the discount rates are influenced 
by both the personal and corporate tax systems. Also, the degree of discrimi- 
nation between retentions and distributions (dividends) in  allocating profits 
plays an important role. See King (1977, chap. 3) and King and Fullerton 
(1984, chap. 2) for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
There are four characteristics that define a hypothetical marginal project. 
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tor,  (3) the way  in which  the project  is financed,  and (4) the owner of  the 
returns.  Each characteristic  may be one of three alternatives. The three asset 
types are machinery, buildings, and inventories; the industries are manufac- 
turing, other industry,  and commerce; the sources of  finance are debt, new 
share issues, and retained earnings; and the ownership categories are house- 
holds, tax-exempt  institutions,  and insurance companies. The three types of 
each of the four characteristics yield eighty-one combinations.  The mean tax 
wedge, @,  is calculated by 
(7) 
k=l 
where a,  is the capital stock weight of the kth combination (Za,  = 1). Using 
equation (7), we can estimate not only the overall mean marginal tax rate but 
also the conditional mean marginal tax rates on investment in particular alter- 
natives. For example, we can estimate the conditional mean tax rate in ma- 
chinery by summing over all the combinations that involve machinery. There 
are twenty-seven  such combinations in all, and empirical results will be dis- 
cussed mainly on the basis of these combinations later. 
Our analysis requires two sets of data: first, the statutory tax rates and the 
various parameter values; second, the (Y weights for the proportion of total net 
capital stock and statistics on financing and ownership.  Shoven and Tachiba- 
naki (1988) provided a detailed discussion of these data sets. 
9.3  Special Features of the Japanese Tax System 
Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988) also provide a brief discussion of the over- 
all Japanese taxation system. Here we focus only on those institutional char- 
acteristics that affect the calculation of the effective marginal taxation of capi- 
tal income in Japan. Those pertaining  to corporations are the enterprise tax, 
special measures for depreciation, and tax-free reserves  in the nonfinancial 
corporate tax system. Those that affect the personal sector include taxation of 
interest and dividend income, and treatment of banking sectors. 
9.3.1  The Corporate Tax Rate and the Enterprise Tax 
There are two basic local taxes in Japan, prefectural taxes and city, town, 
and village taxes.  The enterprise  tax is one of  the local taxes levied  at the 
prefectural level. It is levied on corporations engaged in business that operate 
an office or other place of business, and individuals engaged in several types 
of business or professions described by law. Computation of  income for the 
purpose of levying the prefectural-level tax on corporations is almost the same 
as the computation used at the national level, although the scope of taxable 
income is somewhat different. 
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for ordinary taxable income is 12  percent, for those firms with an annual in- 
come of more than 7,000,000  yen. Although a somewhat lower rate is applied 
to smaller firms, we will use 12 percent as the statutory rate. The most impor- 
tant feature of the enterprise tax is its deductibility in calculating next year's 
taxable income. For this reason, the enterprise tax must be considered sepa- 
rately from the usual corporate and local income taxes. Because of its deduc- 
tibility, the effective tax rate of the enterprise tax is lower than the statutory 
tax rate. The method of  calculating the effective tax rate used in this analysis 
is as follows. 
The amount of deduction in the payment of corporate tax for one unit (yen) 
of enterprise tax, TD,  is given by 
,  with tc = tR(l -  d)  + tD .  d,  -  tC  + tE  - 
l+tE+P 
where tc is the corporate tax rate,  not including the enterprise tax; tR is the 
corporate tax rate for retained earnings; t, is the corporate tax rate for divi- 
dends distributed; tE  is the enterprise tax rate; d is the distribution rate of divi- 
dends in total profits; and p is the nominal discount rate. 
The total amount of  corporate tax, T, when the enterprise tax is taken into 
account, is given by 
*  tEY  tc  + tE  T  = (tc + rE)Y - 
(9)  l+t,+p 
where Y is taxable income. Equation (9) is used for calculating the burden of 
corporate tax  as the effective tax rate. When the nominal discount rate p is 
small enough, its effect on the outcome is negligible. Thus, in our formula we 
will eliminate p. 
We  must also derive equations for the corporate tax rate, T,  and the oppor- 
tunity cost of retained earnings in terms of gross dividends foregone, 8. 
The total tax paid by a corporation is given by 
where G is the gross dividends paid.  8 may  be regarded as the additional 
dividend shareholders could receive if one unit of post-corporate-tax earnings 
were distributed. By combining equations (9) and (lo),  it is possible to obtain 
equation (1  l), assuming dY  = G. 272  Tatsuya Kikutani and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 
1  e= 
+  -  ‘R)/(l  + ‘E)] 
Equation (1  1) is the final form of  T and 8 used later to estimate the effective 
marginal tax rate on capital income. 
9.3.2  Special Measures for Depreciation 
Under the Japanese taxation system, there are two types of special measures 
for depreciations, namely, increased initial depreciation and accelerated de- 
preciation. Both measures can be used in addition to the ordinary depreciation 
allowances. The first allows the deduction of a portion of the acquisition cost 
of an asset for the first accounting period in which such an asset is used. The 
second permits the deduction of a certain percentage of the ordinary deprecia- 
tion of  an allowable asset for certain consecutive accounting periods. Since 
the increased initial depreciation is much more important, it is explained here 
in detail and taken into account explicitly in calculating the effective tax rate. 
The increased initial depreciation, or “special depreciation,” was initially 
introduced in 195  1 to speed the replacement of destroyed or obsolete machin- 
ery and  equipment in the aftermath of  World  War  11.  In  1952 the scope of 
special depreciation was enlarged to include more machinery, and it continued 
to be expanded throughout the decade. The system grew complicated as it 
expanded until, in  1961, in  accordance with the shortened tax lifetimes of 
machinery and  equipment, special depreciation was  simplified. The maxi- 
mum proportion of an allowable asset that could be depreciated in the first 
year was reduced from one-half of  the acquisition cost to one-third. It was 
reduced to one-fourth of  the acquisition cost in  1964, again in  accordance 
with the shortened tax lifetimes. Another reform was introduced in  1973 to 
allow greater special depreciation for environmental pollution control, sav- 
ings from energy conservation, the acquisition of  machinery and equipment 
by  small- or medium-sized enterprises, etc. For 1980, the maximum propor- 
tion of allowable asset we used was one-fifth. 
Examination of the history of special depreciation suggests that shortening 
tax  lifetimes and  introducing special depreciation in  general have  had  the 
same effect on an enterprise’s capital cost burden. In other words, shortened 
lifetimes and reduction in the maximum rate of allowable asset in the first year 
have been used interchangeably to mitigate the excessive effect of either of the 
two policy tools. 
It is noted that the importance of  special depreciation, attested to by  the 
degree of utilization, has been in decline in recent years. Table 9.1 shows this 
trend. The figures in  the table are the proportions of  the acquisition assets 
entitled to special depreciation. It is found that the influence of special depre- 
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1980 shows the least effect. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the 
corporate sector's demand for a lighter tax burden has weakened in recent 
years in Japan. Indeed, the corporate sector has been calling for a reduction in 
the tax lifetimes of  assets. A  simulation addressing this issue will be  per- 
formed later. 
It is worthwhile to examine how the actual depreciable periods of machin- 
ery  and  equipment are shortened when  special depreciations are applied. 
Table 9.2 shows the statutory years of tax lifetimes, while table 9.3 indicates 
the depreciable period of  assets to which special depreciations are applied. 
Table 9.1  A Time-series Change inf,-the  Proportion of the Cost of an Asset 
Qualified for Special Depreciation Allowance-by  Industry 
1961  1970  1980 
Manufacturing  0.171  0.274  0.126 
Other industry  0.074  0.293  0.132 
Commerce  0.063  0.166  0.063 
Note:f, = (Ux) X  (Sf"),  where x is the proportion of special depreciation written off in the first 
year; SP  is the amount of special depreciation; and I is the nominal investment. The estimation 
of the amount of special depreciation was obtained using only data from machinery because of 
the difficulty of obtaining data by  asset category. The assumption seems justified since the most 
frequently used assets are machinery. 
Table 9.2  Statutory Useful Lifetime (in years) 
1961  1970and 1980 
Machines  Buildings  Machines  Buildings 
Manufacturing  10.48  31.71  9.53  32.60 
Other industry  13.78  38.89  11.29  37.16 
Commerce  7.40  33.45  6.62  33.44 
Source: Economic Planning Agency, National  Wealth Survey, 1960 and  1970. The figures for 
1980 are the same as those for 1970. 
Table 9.3  The Period of Special Depreciation (straight-line method, 
for machinery only) 
1961  1970  1980 
Manufacturing  6.60  6.89  7.42 
Other industry  8.68  8.16  8.78 
Commerce  4.66  4.78  5.15 
Note: The period L'  is calculated as L'  = (1 -  x - a)/d,  where d is the depreciation rate; x is 
the proportion of  special depreciation written off in the first year; and a  is the salvage value of 
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Obviously, the number of  years in table 9.3 are all smaller than the tax life- 
times in table 9.2. A critical factor explaining this difference is that the assets 
to which special depreciation is applied are depreciated with the same rates as 
ordinary assets. 
Table 9.2 shows that since 1961 the statutory lifetimes for machinery have 
been  shortened, while for buildings there is no  significant change. Further 
reduction is anticipated for the future. Table 9.3 shows that the depreciable 
period of the assets, due to the accounting basis through which special depre- 
ciations are applied, have been prolonged in agreement with the reduction in 
the proportion of first-year write-offs allowed by special depreciation. 
With respect to special depreciation, our final task is to derive the present 
value of  the depreciation allowance, and in  particular the allowance due to 
special depreciation. Let x  be the proportion of special depreciation which is 
in fact written off  in the first year. Then, total tax saving from one unit (yen) 
of investment, A, is given by 
(12)  A =  f,Ad, + f2(Ad2 + XT), 
where f,  is the proportion of the cost of an asset entitled to the standard depre- 
ciation allowance;  f2  is the proportion of  the cost of an asset qualified for the 
special depreciation allowance; and Ad, is the present value of  tax  savings 
arising from the standard depreciation allowance on a unit of investment. For 
a qualified asset, XT is the tax savings from the first-year write-off by special 
depreciation, and Ad2 is the present value of tax savings from the residual after 
the first-year write-off. 
The  great  majority  of  Japanese firms elect either the declining-balance 
method or straight-line method to calculate depreciation. The first method 
arrives at the current depreciation by multiplying the past residual value by a 
(the depreciation rate); thus the value of depreciation at time t for one unit of 
investment is ae-"'. The second method gives a constant amount of deprecia- 
tion, (1 -  a)/L,  where IY is the rate of the residual value of the asset and L  is 
the tax lifetime. Let w, be the proportion of corporations that elect to use the 
declining-balance method of depreciation, and w,  be the proportion that elect 
the straight-line method. Thus, Ad, is given by 
In Japan, w,  is 0.8 and w,  is 0.2. These rates are almost constant during the 
sample period. The rate of the residual value of the asset IY is specified as 0.1 
for all allowable assets. 
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the corporation after the first-year special write-off, it is safe to assume that all 
corporations choose straight-line depreciation because this method is more 
advantageous. Thus, Ad, is given by 
where L' is a depreciable period, depending on the accounting basis used, 
after the first-year special write-off. The value of L'  is given by (1 -  x -  a)/ 
d;  d is equal to (1 -  a)/L.  See footnote in table 9.3. 
The term Ad2 in equation (12), and more specifically equation (14), indi- 
cates the present value of  tax  savings from the residual after the first-year 
write-off by  special depreciation. This term had been overlooked in Shoven 
and Tachibanaki (1988). 
9.3.3  Tax-free Reserves 
There are several types of  tax-free reserves allowed under the Japanese tax- 
ation system which serve to reduce the corporate tax burden. Noguchi (1985) 
has proposed that the importance of  these reserves increased until the mid- 
1970s and has been declining since. According to Tajika and Yui (1984), the 
amount of corporate tax reduced as a result of tax-free reserves has continu- 
ously shrunk since the mid-1960s and by  1980 was negligible. On  the basis 
of  these findings, tax-free reserves were ignored in Shoven and Tachibanaki 
(1988). It is, however, advisable to take them into account for the period be- 
fore 1980, as mentioned earlier. 
Tax-free reserves are classified into two categories, namely, hikiatekin and 
jumbikin.  The hikiatekin,  roughly  speaking, are those reserves justified by 
generally accepted accounting principles, and are thus provided for in the cor- 
porate tax law. The hikiatekin consist of reserves for future debts or for such 
expenditures as retirement payments, bonus payments, and  bad debts. The 
jumbikin differ, howevei, because they are not duly accepted by  accounting 
principles. The jumbikin are allowed, in exceptional cases, for reaching cer- 
tain specific economic goals, such as dealing with the uncertainty of  price 
fluctuations, overseas market development, or investment loss. It is important 
to note that the reserves are deductible as expenses in one year but are in- 
cluded in gross income in the next. In other words, the reserves are tax defer- 
rals but not tax exemptions. 
Several studies have discussed the economic effect of  these reserves. The 
reserves have been found to be effective in reducing the corporate tax burden, 
and thereby encouraging corporate investment activity (Tajika and Yui 1984; 
Tajika, Hayashi, and Yui 1987; Noguchi 1985). It has also been argued that 
these reserves have only benefited larger corporations because they  make 
greater use of reserves than do smaller corporations. In other words, smaller 
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free reserves, whereas larger firms do (Shoven and Tachibanaki 1988; Wada 
1980). These are important issues, but they are not directly addressed here. 
However, we will attempt to incorporate tax-free reserves in our estimate of 
the effective marginal tax rate on capital income. 
All of the reserves, except for retirement allowances, are deductible as ex- 
penses in each accounting period. The amount credited is added back in full 
to income in the following accounting period. For retirement allowances, the 
amount credited to reserves may be deducted up to a limit. The limit is set at 
an amount equal to the increase in the total amount of  retirement allowances 
claimable by all employees of the corporation. Thus, the amount credited to 
the reserve for retirement allowance is in fact equal to the amount credited to 
the reserve for retirement, payable at each accounting period under the system 
of adding back in full. See Tajika, Hayashi, and Yui (1987) for an interpreta- 
tion of retirement allowances and formulations. 
Let R be the total reserves. The quantity R may be equal to the sum of the 
reserve for retirement payable at the end of  the accounting period and the 
reserve for systems other than the retirement allowance. Since the rate of cor- 
porate tax is T,  a corporation may save the amount TR in one year. However, 
the amount R is added back in full to income in the next year. Consequently, 
the net tax saving arising from these reserves is given by 
where p is the nominal discount rate. 
We  are interested in the net tax saving derived from one unit of investment 
(AK).  The net tax saving due to tax-free reserves for this investment, B, may 




B  = PT -  / (1 + p). 
This may be regarded as a subsidy paid by  the government to a corporation. 
Table 9.4 presents our estimates of the values of  ARIAK. The values are 
highest for all three industries in  1970, while the values for 1961 and  1980 
differ among industries. 
9.4  Estimation of the Effective Tax Rates in the Personal and 
Banking Sectors 
Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988) used, as a first approximation, the average 
tax rates of  interest income and dividend income based on personal income 
tax data, rather than the weighted-average marginal tax rates. In view of the 
importance of the tax rates of interest and dividend income, we will attempt 
to estimate the marginal tax rate. 277  Taxation of  Income from Capital in Japan 
able  9.4  Estimated Values of ARIAK by Industry 













Note: R is the total reserves; K is the capital stock. 
Source: For R, Survey ofcorporare Finns Viaoedfrom.Tax  Data (1970, 1980), Japanese Ministry 
of Finance. Since the above surveys are unavailable before 1963, the amount of tax-free  reserve 
for 1961 was extracted from Annual Yearbook of  Incorporared Firm (1961: Japanese Ministry 
of Finance; in Japanese). Unfortunately, these two sources do not use common industry classifi- 
cations. Thus, it is possible that the amounts given for  1961 are somewhat underestimated. 
This is an extremely difficult task for the following reasons. First, a consid- 
erable number of nontaxable forms of saving is legally allowed. Second, both 
the system of withholding taxation (at a separate rate) within a certain limit 
and the system of comprehensive income taxation (at a progressive tax rate) 
for interest and dividends are prepared, at the taxpayer's  option. Third, if  a 
household has several members, it can increase nontaxable savings-and  it is 
widely held that nontaxable savings are frequently abused. Fourth, since our 
framework regards the banking sector as one of  the household sectors, it is 
necessary to consider the tax rate for the banking sector separately, and then 
to combine it with the tax rate for individuals. 
Our estimation methodologies for deriving the weighted-average marginal 
tax rates for interest and dividend incomes follow.  The actual tax rates are 
estimated on the basis of various reported tax data. Consequently, no adjust- 
ment has been made for the abuse of nontaxable savings, such as a fictitious 
account or false family members. 
9.4.1  Dividend Income 
There are three institutions in the household sector: individuals, banks, and 
stock and securities companies. It is safe to assume that the taxation of stock 
and securities companies is the same as that of individuals, as in Flath (1984). 
Individuals and banks, however, are taxed differently. 
Individuals. Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988) have described a complicated 
system of dividend income taxation, to which three additional considerations 
must be added. First, although a progressive comprehensive income tax must 
be applied in principle for dividend income over a certain amount, in some 
cases only a 20 percent tax is withheld separately. Second, it is possible to 
calculate the marginal tax rate of dividend income that is taxed as a compre- 
hensive income. The Annual Yearbook of  Tax, prepared by the Tax Bureau of 
the Japanese Ministry of Finance, enables us to estimate each marginal rate, 
including both national and local taxes, by  income class, which takes into 
account the tax deductibility of dividends received. The weighted average of 278  Tatsuya Kikutani and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 
the estimated marginal tax rates, with weights being the amount of dividend 
income, is the average marginal rate of dividend income. Since the yearbook 
does not  distinguish  between dividend  income received  by  individuals  and 
that  received  by  corporations, the  distinction  was  made according  to the 
amount of  stocks held. Third, some complications  remain for local income 
taxes when a separate withholding tax  is elected for dividend income at the 
national level. A 42 percent tax rate is obtained by adding a 35 percent sepa- 
rate tax rate at the national level and a 7.  l percent tax rate at the local level. 
The estimated marginal tax rate for each source of taxation in 1980 are given 
in table 9.5. The estimated average marginal tax rate of dividend income is 
44.0 percent. 
Banking  Sector.  Dividend  income received by  corporations  is not  taxed, 
purportedly to avoid double taxation.  However, when dividends received are 
higher than dividends paid, one-fourth of the corporate tax rate is applied to 
the difference. We calculated the difference at about 35 percent, by using data 
from financial statements of firms listed in Nikkei Needs. Since the corporate 
tax rate is 52.6 percent, the tax rate on dividend  income received by banks 
equals 4.5  percent (= Y4  x 0.526 x 0.35). 
Finally, the weighted average of individuals and banks is 27.3 percent, with 
weights being the number of stocks held. This value is our estimated average 
marginal tax rate of dividend income in 1980. Incidentally, this value is 18.7 
percent for 1961 and 21.7 percent  for 1970. Thus, the tax rate of dividend 
income has been increased over the past twenty years. 
9.4.2  Interest Income 
Individuals. The estimated marginal tax rates for each source for the year 
1980 is given in table 9.6. From the table it can be seen that the influence of 
nontaxable  savings is great and has lowered the tax rate of interest income. 
The weighted-average  marginal tax rate,  12.9 percent, is obtained from the 
table. We subtract the proportion of checking accounts which yield no interest 
(about 11.7 percent of total savings) and find the estimated average marginal 
tax rate to be 11.4 percent in 1980, 10.3 percent in 1970, and 9.9 percent in 
1961. 
Banking sector. The main activities banks engage in are collecting  funds 
Table 9.5  The Estimated Marginal Tax Rate on Dividend Income for 1980 
Marginal Tax  Rate  Dividend Income 
(in billions of yen)  (in percentages) 
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Table 9.6  The Estimated Marginal Tax Rate on Interest Income for 1980 
Marginal Tax Rate  Interest Income 
(in percentages)  (in billions of  yen) 
Taxable  20.0 
Nontaxable  0.0  1  Withholding [ 
Comprehensive taxation 




Gains from original issue  16.0  711 
Others  35.0  888 
discount on debentures  Separate taxation 
Source: Annual Yearbook of Tax (1980; Tax Bureau, Japanese Ministry of  Finance). 
from individuals and lending those funds to incorporated nonfinancial firms. 
In general, the main source of  profit from banking lies in the difference be- 
tween the lending rate and the borrowing rate. Banks have various kinds of 
financial goods to collect funds from individuals which have varying interest 
rates, and lending rates differ among banks and also according to which cor- 
poration is borrowing funds. These variations must be taken into account in 
our estimate of the difference between lending rates and borrowing rates. 
The Yearbook of  Financial Sectors, published by  the Ministry of Finance, 
provides the necessary data on an annual basis. We  thus obtain as the differ- 
ences, 1.42 percent in 1961, 1.10 percent in 1970, and 0.17 percent in  1980. 
These figures represent the differences minus banks’ operating costs. Thus, 
the differences may be regarded as the profit due to one unit of savings. Al- 
though these are the average rates of profit, it is plausible to assume that they 
are also the marginal rates of  profit because of  constant returns to scale in 
Japanese banking. Assuming that the distribution rate of  dividends in total 
profits is 30 percent, we obtain as final tax rates for banks, 0.66 percent for 
the year  1961, 0.50 percent for 1970, and 0.08 percent for 1980; and with 
respect to the calculated corporate tax rates for banks, 46.2 percent for the 
year 1961,45.1 percent for 1970, and 49.5 percent for 1980. 
Finally, we may obtain the estimated average marginal tax rates of interest 
income by combining the two sectors. We  arrive at estimated figures of  10.6 
percent for 1961, 10.8 percent for 1970, and 11.4 percent for 1980. It is ap- 
parent that  the  marginal  tax  rates of  interest income have  increased only 
slightly over the past twenty years. 
9.4.3  Capital Gains Taxes 
One can reasonably assume that capital gains taxes are effectively zero for 
the gains from individual transactions. Since, as we have noted, in our frame- 
work the household sector includes the banking sector, it is important that we 
estimate the capital gains tax rate for banks that hold a nonnegligible propor- 
tion of the stocks of nonfinancial incorporated firms. 
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ized and of transactions of the stocks held by banks. Nevertheless, it is often 
said that very few transactions take place because of  certain features of  the 
capital market in Japan (see, e.g., Aoki  1984). Since the effective tax rate 
depends upon the duration, it is necessary to assign a value to it. For simplic- 
ity we adopt ten years as the value, following King and Fullerton (1984). This 
is only a first approximation because no data on duration exist for Japan. 
The statutory rate of  capital gains taxes is equivalent to the corporate tax 
rate. Since data exist regarding the proportion of stock held by banks, we may 
estimate the effective tax rate on capital gains for banks by  multiplying that 
proportion and the tax rate. We  thus estimate the tax rates as 3.64 percent for 
the year 1960,6.17 percent for 1970, and 20.4 percent for 1980. The increase 
is due mainly to the growing trend of  banks holding greater proportions of 
stock. 
9.5  Effective Tax Rates and the Evaluation of Tax Policy 
This section gives estimated results for the effective marginal tax rates on 
income from capital in 1961, 1970, and 1980, and provides tools for evaluat- 
ing the effects of tax policy on investment. We apply the estimation procedure 
of the method expounded in King and Fullerton (1984) to assure comparabil- 
ity. As was explained previously, several modifications have been introduced 
to take Japanese tax laws into account. 
9.5.1 
Table  9.7 shows the results for 1980, and table 9.8 shows the results for 
1970 and 1961. Since the inflation rates during the 1970s were exceptionally 
high, due mainly to the two oil crises, the results in 1980 are reported for four 
different inflation rates, 0, 5, 10, and 8.25 percent (the actual inflation rate 
observed). Because the actual inflation rates were low during the 1950s (1.28 
percent) and the 1960s (3.19 percent), only two inflation rates (zero and ac- 
tual) are considered in those years. Table 9.9 examines the influence exerted 
on the effective tax rates by  institutional arrangements such as special mea- 
sures for depreciation and tax-free reserves assured by  the corporate tax law. 
Tables 9.10 and 9.11 are presented to show the relative contributions of  the 
corporate and personal sectors to the total effective tax rate, and give useful 
supplementary information for interpreting tables 9.7 and 9.8. 
Zero inflation rate. The overall effective marginal tax rates at zero inflation 
rate are 27.2 percent for  1961, 22.0 percent for 1970 and 28.7 percent for 
1980. These numbers solely reflect the effect of the tax law and do not take 
into account the effect of inflation. Several reasons can be given for the much 
lower rate in  1970. First, the corporate tax rate T in  1970 was lower than in 
1961 and  1980, and the discrimination parameter 0 was  higher. These two 
values obviously reduce the tax burden of corporations. Second, as table 9.9 
clearly shows, the contribution of special measures for depreciation and tax- 
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Table 9.7  Effective  Marginal Tax Rates for 1980 (fixed-p case; in percentages) 
Inflation Rate 
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Note: The U.S. result is based on King and Fullerton (1984) 
free reserves was greatest in 1970. A simulation that did not take into account 
both special depreciation and tax-free reserves and that applied the rates in 
1980 for the parameters 7 and 8, gave a higher value for the effective rate (i.e., 
26.0 percent). As table 9.10 indicates, the effective rate for the corporate sec- 
tor, 14 percent, the lowest of the three years compared, was the factor contrib- 
uting most to this low effective marginal tax rate in  1970. Whether govern- 
ment tax policy, in lowering the effective tax rate around 1970, had a positive 
effect on raising the amount of investment is a topic for future inquiry. 
The high effective tax rate in  1961 is somewhat surprising. It had been 
anticipated that the effective tax rate would be lower for the 1960s because of 
the  high  rate  of  investment activity,  characteristic of  the  rapid  economic 
growth in those years. However, our analysis gives evidence of a heavy tax 
burden, owing mainly to the high corporate sector rate,  as shown in table 
9.10. One of  the reasons for the corporate sector’s heavy tax burden in 1961 
was the weak effect of both special depreciation and tax-free reserves. 
It is interesting to inquire why a high rate of  investment activity was ob- 
served despite the relatively high rate of tax on investment in this period. One 
reason is that relatively favorable investment financing was provided through 282  Tatsuya Kikutani and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 
Table 9.8  Effective Marginal Tax Rates for 1970 and 1961 (fixed-p  case; 
in percentages) 
Inflation Rate 
1970  1961 
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Overall  43.8  47.2  44.9  48.4 
Note: The U.S.  result is based on King and Fullerton (1984). 
government financial sources in order to encourage investment activity on the 
part of private corporations in the iron and steel, electric power, and transpor- 
tation industries, as Kosai (1985), and Ogura and Yoshino  (1985) suggest. 
This may be regarded as one form of  government-initiated industrial policy 
following World  War  11.  Our study does not estimate the effective marginal 
tax rate for investment financed through government channels, thus this expla- 
nation is offered only as a conjecture, not on the basis of  rigorous statistical 
evidence. Another reason may be the animal spirits of  private corporations, 
who approached investment in these years expecting great prosperity from the 
Japanese economy, despite a high rate of tax burden for capital income. 
Finally, it should be noted that the tax burden for corporations has been 
considerable in recent years, as is suggested by the result for 1980. There are 
several reasons for this. First, the influence of favorable institutional arrange- 
ments, such as special depreciation and tax-free reserves, has been gradually 
eliminated, as table 9.9 shows. This is consistent with the findings in Noguchi 
(1985). Second, since the oil crises, the growth rate of revenues from personal 283  Taxation of  Income from Capital in Japan 
Table 9.9  The Effect of Tax-Free Reserves and Special Measures for 
Depreciation on the Effective Marginal Tax Rates in Japan 
(fixed-p case; in percentages) 
Inflation Rate 
0%  5%  Actual 
1980 
Special measures for depreciation 
Tax-free reserves 
Combined 
Special measures for depreciation 
Tax-free reserves 
Combined 






-  1.0 
-  1.2 
-  1.0 
-  2.0 
-2.8 




-  1.7 
-  2.0 
-  1.2 
-  3.4 
-4.5 
-0.5 
-  1.4 
-  1.8 
-0.3 
-  2.2 
-  2.5 
-  1.1 
-2.9 
-  3.9 
-0.4 
-0.9 
-  1.3 
Nofes: The figures give the difference between the effective marginal tax rate when the effect of 
special measures is not taken into account and the effective marginal tax rate in the standard case. 
For example, the figures in the first row indicate the contribution of special depreciation to the 
total effective marginal tax rate in the standard case. Negative values imply that the tax rate is 
lowered; positive values imply that it is raised. 
income taxes has been declining in accordance with the slow growth rate of 
'  the economy. The government has had  to raise revenues through corporate 
taxation to compensate for the gradual loss of revenues from personal income 
tax. Third, it is held that the statutory useful lifetimes of assets are somewhat 
longer than their real lifetimes in view of rapid technological change. 
Actual injution rates. The actual inflation rates, which are simple averages 
of  the wholesale price index and the consumer price index over the past ten 
years, were (in percentages); 1.28 in  1961, 3.19 in 1970, and 8.25 in  1980. 
The extremely high inflation rate in 1980 (the 1970s) was due largely to the 
two oil crises and subsequent inflationary pressure. The most important find- 
ing derived from the consideration of inflation is that effective tax rates decline 
considerably as the rate of inflation is increased. As figure 9.1 indicates, the 
decline took place in  both the United Kingdom and Japan, but the rate of 
decline was steeper in Japan. 
Also, it is found that the change in the effective rate due to an increase in 
the inflation rate from 0% to 5% is 10.8 percentage points in 1960, 11.4 per- 
centage points in  1970, and 10.3 percentage points in 1980. In other words, 
the effective tax rate has always been sensitive to inflation in Japan. 
Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988) gave several reasons for the strong effect of 
inflation. First was the heavy reliance on debt financing for corporate finance 
in  Japan. Debt financing has two effects. One,  since nominal interest pay- Table 9.10  Effective Marginal Tax Rates for the Corporate Sector in Japan and the United States 
(in percentages) 
Inflation Rate 
0%  10%  Actual 
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14.0  -23.2  3.2 
19.8  -  16.4  15.7 
~  ~  ~~  ~~  ~~ 
Note: The U.S. result is based on King and Fullerton (1984). A dash means that we have not calculated the rates. Table 9.11  Effective Marginal Tax Rates for the Personal Sector in Japan and the United States (in  percentages) 
Inflation Rate 
0%  10%  Actual 
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8.0  20.0  11.8 
7.4  19.7  9.0 
Nore: The U.S. result is based on King and Fullerton (1984). A dash means that we have not calculated the rates. 286  Tatsuya Kikutani and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 
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Overall effective tax rates as the inflation rates vary in the U.K., 
ments  are deductible from corporate income tax, debt financing  lowers the 
discount rate even without inflation, and thus lowers the cost of capital. Two, 
when the rate of inflation grows, nominal interest payments increase because 
the nominal interest rate is increased. At the same time, however, it is possible 
that the tax burden on personal  interest income received also grows with an 
increase in inflation. If this effect were stronger than the effect of the former, 
the combined tax burden might increase. Since the corporate tax rate is much 
higher than the tax rate on interest income in Japan, the combined effect in 
fact lowers the effective tax rate of capital income. The second reason given 
for the strong effect of inflation was the fact that the role of FIFO accounting 
is relatively weak. Third, the marginal tax rate for personal saving (especially 
interest income) is low. Fourth, the role of depreciation diminishes in impor- 
tance as the inflation rate increases. Of the four reasons, the two most impor- 
tant factors are a heavy reliance on debt financing and the low tax rate for 
saving. 
We have conducted a simulation for the Japanese economy in 1980 to verify 
the above. We replace the proportion of debt financing in Japan by the Amer- 
ican  one,  and  the  tax  rates  for savings  by  the  American  rates,  which  are 
adapted from King and Fullerton (1984). The rate of  debt finance in Japan in 
1980 was 39.8 percent for manufacturing,  59.8 percent for other industries, 
and 43.7 percent for commerce, while the rate in the United States was 19.8 
percent, 48.5 percent, and 40.0 percent, respectively.  The average marginal 287  Taxation of  Income from Capital in Japan 
tax rate on interest income was 1  1.4  percent in Japan and 28.4 percent in the 
United States. 
Table 9.12 shows the result of the simulation. Row  1 gives the estimated 
effective tax rates produced by  the first replacement, row  2 by  the second 
replacement, and row 3 by the combined simulation. Row  1 indicates that the 
effective tax rate is lowered because Japanese firms rely heavily on debt fi- 
nancing, and that if the rate of debt in Japan was the same as the U.S. one, the 
effective tax  rate would  be raised  considerably and  the effect of  inflation 
would simultaneously be lowered significantly.  Row 2 shows that the effect of 
inflation becomes weaker because the benefit of the tax deductibility of nom- 
inal interest payments lessens and the effect of  personal interest income re- 
ceipt becomes stronger. Row 3 shows the combined effect. Although the de- 
clining trend of the effect due to inflation is not reversed by each replacement, 
the degree of  the decline is reduced. Moreover, if we  see the result by  the 
combined simulation, we notice that inflation is no longer effective. Thus, it 
may be concluded that a high reliance on debt financing and a low tax rate for 
interest income are the most important factors underlying the excessive sen- 
sitivity to inflation in Japan, and that the unexpectedly high rate of inflation in 
the past decade has helped Japanese corporations to reduce the tax burden of 
capital income. 
The last point suggests an  interesting interpretation of  the excellent per- 
formance of the Japanese macroeconomy during and after the oil crises. The 
performance may be explained by the unexpectedly low rate of  corporate tax 
burden provided by both the high inflation and the oft-mentioned flexibilities 
in  labor and output markets. This is only a speculation and requires more 
precise verification. 
Comparison with  Shoven and  Tachibanaki. The estimated marginal tax 
rates for 1980 presented here are about 5-6  percent higher than the rates esti- 
Table 9.12  Estimated Effective Tax Rates from Substituting U.S. for Japanese 
Rates of Debt Financing and Tax Rates for Saving (in percentages) 
Inflation Rates 


















Nora: Row  1 is the estimated effective tax rates obtained by  replacing the rate of debt financing 
in Japan by the one in the U.S. Row 2 is the estimated effective tax rates obtained by replacing 
the tax rate for savings in Japan by the one in the U.S. Row 3 is the combination of rows 1 and 
2. The final row gives the original U.S. figures. 288  Tatsuya Kikutani and Toshiaki Tachibanaki 
mated by Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988), for several reasons. First, the effec- 
tive tax rate of dividend income is found to be considerably higher because of 
a more comprehensive treatment of the banking sector and because the mar- 
ginal calculation with respect to the effective tax rate was used instead of the 
average calculation. Second, the method of  introducing special depreciation 
is somewhat different. Moreover, we  explicitly considered the effect of tax- 
free reserves in this framework. The first factor raised the effective tax rates 
of  capital income marginally in comparison with the results of  Shoven and 
Tachibanaki, while the second lowered them marginally. Third, while Shoven 
and Tachibanaki assumed a zero rate of salvage value in calculating deprecia- 
tion, our method assumed a rate of  10 percent, which is closer to reality. This 
assumption raised the effective rate considerably. 
Comparison with the US. results. Both the zero inflation and actual infla- 
tion cases show a lower effective tax rate in Japan than in the United States 
with respect to the overall tax rates. This proved true for all years studied. The 
most dramatic difference is observed at the actual rate of inflation in  1980. 
More importantly, the rates in the past (the 1960s and 1970s) are considerably 
lower, by about half, in Japan than in the United States. Two main reasons can 
be suggested to account for the difference. First, the Japanese tax rate,  in 
particular the tax rate on interest income, is considerably lower. Second, Ja- 
pan relied on debt financing more strongly. Several other minor factors also 
contribute to the difference. 
The fact that the effective tax rate of capital income has consistently been 
lower in Japan than in the United States suggests that one of the principles of 
the “catching up” process has been in effect in Japan. It may well be that the 
lower effective tax rate of  capital income encouraged more investment and 
resulted in more intensive industrialization. Thus, the lower tax rate-in  par- 
ticular, a lower tax rate on interest income-may  be regarded as one of  the 
industrial policies initiated by  the government in the early stage of  the rapid 
economic growth. The other reason for the comparatively low effective rate, 
namely, heavy reliance on debt financing, is not a government initiative but 
rather a natural consequence of the capital market’s underdevelopment during 
that period. Firms had to seek their financial resources at banks where a con- 
siderable amount of savings were deposited in order to be able to satisfy their 
strong propensity to invest (see Tachibanaki 1988). 
9.5.2  Decomposition of Effective Tax Rates into Corporate Sector and 
Personal Sector 
The previous two sections examined the overall effective marginal tax rate 
of  capital income. In  this section we  will attempt to decompose these rates 
into the separate contributions of the corporate sector and the personal sector. 
The results, shown in tables 9.10 and 9.11 indicate the relative tax burden 
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Table 9.10 is obtained by inserting the zero tax rates for the personal sector. 
The effective rate estimated by this method is in fact the tax rate for the cor- 
porate sector. The difference between the previous overall effective tax rates 
given in table 9.7 and the estimated tax rates for the corporate sector is the 
estimated effective tax rate for the personal sector. In sum, table 9.10 is the 
contribution (or decomposition) made by  the corporate sector to the overall 
effective tax rate,  and table 9.11 is the contribution of  the personal sector. 
Identical investigations were performed for Japan and the United  States to 
provide a basis for comparison. 
Table 9.10 indicates that the effective tax rates for the corporate sector in 
both  Japan  and the  United  States declined as the rate of  inflation was  in- 
creased. This relationship primarily occurs because the deductibility of nomi- 
nal interest payments has a greater effect than both depreciation at historical 
cost and FIFO inventory accounting. Thus, in the United States the increase 
in the overall combined tax rate that occurred as the rate of inflation rose can 
be attributed to the taxation of nominal capital gains in the personal sector. By 
contrast, in the Japanese case a high rate of reliance on debt in the corporate 
sector gave a  stronger negative effect from inflation, as described before. 
When we consider the effective rates by  assets, we observe that inventories 
are affected most by this channel. Among the three categories of  industry, 
nonmanufacturing was affected the greatest. 
Although it is true that the effective tax rates at a zero inflation rate are 
higher in Japan than in the United States, the reverse is true for the effective 
rates at actual inflation rates. This statement contradicts the belief commonly 
held in Japan that the tax burden of corporations in Japan is heavier than in the 
United States. It is possible, however, that the relationship may be currently 
inverted,  because the rate  of  inflation has  declined considerably in recent 
years and the United States introduced a far-reaching tax reform in the Eco- 
nomic Recovery Act of  198  1. This does not necessarily imply, however, that 
the inversion holds for the overall combined effective tax rate. 
In table 9.1  1, as was seen previously, the tax rate on savings has increased 
only modestly, from 7.4 percent in  1961 and 9.0 percent in 1980, at the zero 
inflation rate. The effective tax rates are all lower in Japan than in the United 
States, except in  the ownership categories. It must be emphasized that the 
dispersion in  the tax rates at the zero inflation rate  is wider in  the United 
States, from -  11.7 to 24.8 percent. In Japan the tax rates in question range 
from 0.5 to  13.6 percent. When the inflation rate is high, the difference is 
greater still. There are two reasons for this result. First, tax deductibility is 
enormous for tax-exempt institutions in the United States, and second, nomi- 
nal tax deductions for American insurance companies are considerable. As a 
consequence, the U.S. tax rates on savings may be more distortionary. Since 
the Japanese tax rates are lower in general, we expect the distortionary effect 
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9.6  Some Simulation Results 
In  this section we  present several simulation results using current policy 
issues in  Japan. The Ministry of  Finance made some tax  reforms, both  in 
income tax and corporate tax. See Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988) and Tachi- 
banaki and Ichioka (1990) for discussions of the current policy issues related 
to tax reform. The simulations contained here scrutinize the economic effect 
of the tax reforms conceived by the government and proposed by industry. 
9.6.1 
Reform of the tax rate on interest income has been proposed recently. The 
previous law allowing nontaxable savings had been under criticism for exces- 
sively encouraging savings and for only providing an advantage to the rich. 
One possible reform that was considered was the introduction of a low rate, 
perhaps  10 or 20 percent, as a separate tax rate for all currently nontaxable 
interest income. Table 9.13 shows the estimated marginal tax rates resulting 
from such a reform.2 It is clear that the effective marginal tax rates are raised 
considerably. The rate of  increase, however, is greater when the rate of infla- 
tion is higher. These results suggest that raising the tax rate of interest income 
in response to the criticisms above may in fact be detrimental to investment 
activity, because the effective tax rate on capital income would be raised. The 
simulation provides us an example of the trade-off effects due to tax reform. 
9.6.2 
There is a strong demand from industry to shorten the lifetimes of assets in 
order to reduce the corporate tax burden. Shortening the lifetimes obviously 
speeds the pace  of  depreciation.  Special depreciation measures have  been 
common in the past. The provision of the special depreciation, however, has 
been weakened because the measure has not been uniformly applied, enforced 
only for certain machinery or specific purposes. A demand for shortening 
The Tax Rate on Interest Income 
Shortening the Tax Lifetimes of Assets 
Table 9.13  Effective Marginal Tax Rates When the Taxation of Interest Income 
(Separate Taxation) is Introduced (in percentages) 
Inflation Rates 
Tax  Rate  0%  2.5%  5.0%  Actual 
~~  ~ 
10% 
Debt  4.5  -  10.1  -25.5  -46.8 
Household  30.3  26.0  20.8  13.0 
Overall  30.3  26.2  21.1  13.5 
20% 
Debt  7.9  -5.2  -  19.1  -38.4 
Household  32.3  28.8  24.5  17.7 
Overall  31.9  28.4  24.0  17.3 291  Taxation of  Income from Capital in Japan 
lifetimes of all machinery and equipment uniformly is frequently made be- 
cause rapid technological change requires shorter lifetimes of  assets. Also, 
tax lifetimes in Japan have been somewhat longer than those in  the United 
States in recent years. 
In the simulation performed here we reduce the lifetimes for all assets by 
uniform rates of  10, 15, and 20 percent. We  also consider the effect of reduc- 
ing salvage value (or the residual rate) of assets. In principle it is 10 percent 
currently, but 5 percent can be chosen at a firm’s option and a zero rate may 
be applied for special assets. Industry frequently calls for a zero percent rate. 
Table 9.14 shows the effective tax rates for various combinations of residual 
rates and percentage reductions in statutory lifetimes of  assets at zero infla- 
tion. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated corporate income tax rates 
which would produce the same effective tax rate as that generated from each 
hypothetical value for the residual rate and the percentage reduction. The table 
suggests the following results. First, when the salvage value equals 10 percent 
of the acquisition cost, the effective tax rate is reduced by  about one percent- 
age point in proportion to a 10 percent reduction in the tax lifetime. This is 
equivalent to a 3 percent reduction in corporate income tax. Second, a reduc- 
tion in the residual rate of assets has a much greater effect than the reduction 
in  lifetimes. Lowering the residual rate from 10 to 5 percent has the same 
effect as a 5.1 percent reduction in the corporate income tax when we adopt 
the current lifetimes. Furthermore, the zero percent residual rate brings about 
the same effect as the 9.6 percent reduction in the corporate tax rate. This is 
equivalent to a 30 percent reduction in the lifetimes. Third, if we combine the 
two effects mentioned above, we recognize that a stronger effect is obtained. 
This is to say, the more the residual rate falls, the higher the corporate tax rate 
is reduced when the lifetimes are shortened. For instance, when the residual 
rate is zero, the effective tax rate decreases by 1.3 percentage points, which is 
Table 9.14  Effective Marginal Tax Rates When Changes in the Lifetimes of 
Assets and in Salvage (Residual) Rates are Introduced 
Salvage (Residual) Rate 
10%  5%  0% 
Current tax lifetime  28.7  27.1  25.8 
(52.6)  (47.5)  (43.0) 
10% Reduction  27.8  26.0  24.5 
15%  Reduction  27.3  25.4  23.8 
(48.1)  (41.7)  (36.5) 
20% Reduction  26.8  24.8  23.0 
(46.5)  (39.8)  (34.0) 
Note:  The numbers in parentheses  are the estimated corporate  tax rates (7)  which are provided by 
the hypothetical lifetimes and salvage rates. 
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equivalent to a 4.3  percent reduction in the corporate tax rate in the case of  a 
10 percent reduction in lifetimes. 
The last point has important economic implications because the amendment 
of both tax lifetimes and residual rates is under way.  The amendments would 
lighten the tax burden of corporations considerably, much more so than would 
the reduction in the corporate tax rate proposed by the Ministry of Finance. 
9.7  Concluding Remarks 
The effective marginal tax of capital income was found to be lowest in 1970 
at zero inflation, and we conjectured that this low rate encouraged investment 
activity in the 1960s and the early 1970s, resulting in the rapid growth of the 
Japanese economies. This conjecture, however, must be verified by a separate 
study. Several institutional arrangements, such as special depreciations and 
tax-free reserves, were particularly effective in lowering the marginal tax rates 
in those years. The effective tax rates were almost equal in  1961 and 1980. 
For all years studied, the effective rates were found to be lower in Japan than 
in the United States. 
The estimated marginal tax rates were found to be extremely sensitive to 
inflation throughout the sample period. Thus, the effective rate given actual 
inflation was lowest in 1980 because the inflation rates in the 1970s were very 
high. Two reasons for the extreme sensitivity to inflation were the heavy reli- 
ance on debt for corporate financing and the low personal tax rate on savings. 
Simulations were provided to support these explanations more rigorously. 
Decomposition analyses were attempted to examine the contributions of the 
corporate and personal sectors to the overall effective tax rate. It was found 
that while inflation lightens the tax burden of  corporations, it increases the 
burden on households. 
Finally, several simulations were performed to predict the outcomes of sev- 
eral tax reforms which have been implemented quite recently. The following 
results were obtained on the basis of  the simulations. First, abolishing the 
system of nontaxable savings in the area of personal taxation raised the effec- 
tive tax rate considerably. This is particularly true during periods of high infla- 
tion. Second, shortening the tax lifetimes of assets and eliminating the salvage 
rate served to reduce the tax burden of corporations, and thus the effective tax 
rates on capital income. 
Notes 
1.  It was originally planned to perform our analysis for 1960, but difficulty in ac- 
quiring data for 1960 and the major tax reform in 1961 led us to consider 1961 instead. 
2.  In fact, a 20 percent withholding separate tax rate on interest income was imple- 
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